We investigate an assignment market in which multiple objects are sold to a group of unit-demand agents with preferences accommodating income effects. In such a market, the minimum price equilibrium (MPE) is of particular research interest. We give new structural properties of the MPEs. Based on these properties, we further propose an adjustment process, "the Serial Vickrey process," which finds an MPE in a finite number of steps and only requires agents to report finitely many "indifference prices." The Serial Vickrey process introduces objects one by one, which is decomposed into several steps, each introducing a new object. In each step, "the Serial Vickrey sub-process," consisting of two stages, finds an MPE for k+1 objects by using an MPE for k objects. We show that the Serial Vickrey process is both step-wise and stage-wise strategy-proof. In addition, we also discuss the potential empirical implication of the Serial Vickrey process in the housing market research.
